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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Lainey Raye Gonzalez appeals from the district court’s intermediate appellate opinion
reversing the magistrate court’s order granting her motion to suppress.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Sergeant Hodges was driving northbound on Ten Mile Road at approximately 1 a.m. in
the lane closest to the sidewalk. (R., p.45; 10/2/19 Tr., p.8, Ls.7-19; p.9, Ls.4-11. 1) The roadway
was straight, flat, and dry.

(10/2/19 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-9; p.32, Ls.1-2; See State’s Exs.1-3.)

Notwithstanding the road conditions, Sergeant Hodges observed a car driving directly in front of
him that was weaving within its lane. (R., p.45; 10/2/19 Tr., p.8, L.20 – p.9, L.11.) The car
crossed the fog line into an adjacent bike lane three or four times, sometimes by more than a foot.
(R., p.45; 10/2/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.2-17.) At one point, the car travelled roughly 200 yards while
straddling the fog line. (Id.) Consequently, Sergeant Hodges initiated a traffic stop. (R., p.46;
10/2/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.18-25.) Gonzalez was the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. (R., p.46.)
After further investigation, Gonzalez was arrested for driving under the influence. (Id.)
The state charged Gonzalez with driving under the influence (second offense) and driving
without privileges. (R., pp.14-15.) Gonzalez filed a motion to suppress and memorandum in
support. (R., pp.18-21.) She asserted that Sergeant Hodges lacked reasonable suspicion to
conduct a traffic stop pursuant to State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585, 590, 416 P.3d 957, 962 (2018)
(holding that a tire temporarily touching or crossing the fog line will not by itself give rise to a

1

The transcript of the suppression hearing is contained in the record with the amended exhibits.
(Appeal Amended Exhibit, pp.4-16.)

1

reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver has violated Idaho Code § 49-637(1)). 2 (R.,
pp.18-22.) The state responded in opposition. (See R., pp.4, 44; 10/2/19 Tr., p.5, Ls.5-12. 3)
The magistrate court held a suppression hearing. (R., pp.24-25; see generally 10/2/19 Tr.)
During the hearing, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Sergeant Hodges regarding why he
initiated the traffic stop. (10/2/19 Tr., p.9, L.23.) Sergeant Hodges testified that he conducted
the traffic stop because his observation of Gonzalez’s driving pattern led him “to believe [she]
might be impaired or under the influence.” (10/2/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.23-25.) In closing argument, the
prosecutor distinguished this case from Fuller and asserted that Gonzalez’s driving pattern gave
rise to reasonable suspicion that she violated I.C. § 49-637(1). (10/2/19 Tr., p.36, L.12 – p.41,
L.7.) The court took the matter under advisement. (10/2/19 Tr., p.46, Ls.21-25.) Following the
hearing, both parties filed supplemental briefs. (R., pp.32-43; see R., p.4. 4)
The magistrate court granted the motion to suppress, holding that the traffic stop was not
justified by reasonable suspicion because “Gonzalez’s conduct did not rise to the level of
violating Idaho Code § 49-637.” (R., pp.44-49.) The state timely appealed. (R., pp.51-53.)
On intermediate appeal to the district court, the state argued that the trial court incorrectly
concluded that a violation of I.C. § 49-637(1) did not occur. (R., pp.65-69.) The state also
argued that “the trial court’s analysis is incomplete” because it did not consider whether
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Idaho Code § 49-637(1) provides, “A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely
within a single lane and shall not be moved from that lane until the driver has first ascertained
that the movement can be made with safety.”
3

The state’s response to Gonzalez’s motion to suppress is not in the record. (See generally R.,
pp.1-108.)
4

The state’s response to Gonzalez’s supplemental brief is not in the record. (See generally R.,
pp.1-108.)
2

Gonzalez’s driving pattern provided reasonable suspicion of DUI. (Id.) In response, Gonzalez
argued that whether Sergeant Hodges’s observations amounted to reasonable suspicion of DUI
was not preserved for appeal because the state had “disavowed” that theory during the
suppression hearing. (R., pp.76-82 (citing 10/2/19 Tr., p.40, Ls.1-5).) She further argued that the
trial court correctly concluded that the traffic stop “was not supported by reasonable suspicion
that she had committed a traffic offense.” (R., pp.82-86.) In reply, the state asserted that its
arguments were properly preserved for appeal. (R., pp.87-93.)
The district court held oral argument. (R., p.96; see generally 8/5/20 Tr., pp.4-15). The
district court held that the issue of whether the stop was justified by a reasonable suspicion of
DUI was preserved by the officer’s testimony explaining why he made the stop. (R., p.101; see
10/2/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.18-25.) The court also held that “[w]hether the officer’s observation of
[Gonzalez’s] driving was sufficient to establish a violation of I.C. § 49-637(1) is not
determinative” and that Sergeant Hodges “had reasonable suspicion to stop” Gonzalez based on
his reasonable suspicion that she was impaired. (R., pp.101-02.) Accordingly, the district court
reversed the magistrate court’s order granting Gonzalez’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.97-102).
Gonzalez timely appealed. (R., pp.104-05.)

3

ISSUE
Gonzalez states the issue on appeal as:
Did the District Court err on appeal from the trial court by considering an
argument the state had previously disavowed before the trial court?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Gonzalez failed to show that the district court erred on intermediate appeal by
reversing the order of the magistrate court granting the motion to suppress?

4

ARGUMENT
Gonzalez Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Reversed The Magistrate
Court’s Order Granting The Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Gonzalez asserts the district court erroneously considered the argument that

Sergeant Hodges stopped her based on a reasonable suspicion that she was impaired or driving
under the influence. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-10.) According to Gonzalez, this argument was
unpreserved for appellate review because state “affirmatively disavowed” it before the trial
court. (Id. (emphasis in original).) Her argument fails for three reasons. First, Gonzalez has
failed to present an adequate record to support her claim of error as the written arguments
submitted by the state to the trial court are not contained in the record. Second, the district court
correctly determined that the issue of whether the traffic stop was justified by Sergeant Hodges’s
reasonable suspicion of DUI was preserved for appeal and correctly reversed the magistrate
court’s order on this basis. Finally, even if the state’s DUI theory was unpreserved, the district
court correctly reversed the magistrate’s order granting the motion to suppress because under a
totality of the circumstances, Sergeant Hodges’s observation of Gonzalez’s driving pattern
amounted to reasonable suspicion that she violated I.C. § 49-637(1).
B.

Standard Of Review
For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the

magistrate division, this Court reviews the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact and whether the
magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 413, 415,
224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). However, the appellate courts do not review the decision of the
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magistrate. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Rather, as
a matter of appellate procedure, the appellate courts affirm or reverse the decision of the district
court. Id.
The standard of review of the trial court’s order granting or denying a motion to suppress
is bifurcated. State v. Rebo, 168 Idaho 234, ___, 482 P.3d 569, 572 (2020). When the trial
court’s decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate courts accept the trial court’s
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely review the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133,
135 (2005).
C.

Gonzalez Has Failed To Show That The Issue Of Whether The Traffic Stop Was
Supported By Reasonable Suspicion Of DUI Was Beyond The District Court’s Review
“Error will not be presumed on appeal, but must be affirmatively shown in the record.

The appellant has the burden of providing an adequate record on appeal from which the Court
can conduct an intelligent review of a trial court’s decision.” State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804,
805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996) (citations omitted).
In this case, Gonzalez’s claim of error is unreviewable because she has failed to present
an adequate record from which this Court can conduct an intelligent review. It is apparent from
the face of the record that the state filed a response in opposition to Gonzalez’s motion to
suppress. (R., pp.4, 44; 10/2/19 Tr., p.5, Ls.5-10.) Likewise, the record shows that the state filed
a response in opposition to Gonzalez’s post-hearing brief in support of her motion to suppress.
(R., p.4.) However, neither of these documents appears in the record. (See R., pp.1-108.) Thus,
the only evidence in the record establishing the theories and arguments raised by the state before
the trial court is the transcript of the suppression hearing. (See generally 10/2/19 Tr.) Without
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the state’s written arguments, this Court cannot adequately review the merits of Gonzalez’s claim
that the state abandoned an argument during the suppression hearing only to resurrect the same
on intermediate appeal.
That Gonzalez failed to provide an adequate record for intelligent review of her claim of
error is especially true considering the fact that the parties filed post-hearing briefs. Gonzalez
argues that the state abandoned the argument that the traffic stop was justified by reasonable
suspicion of DUI during the suppression hearing. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-10.) Importantly, the
parties filed post-hearing briefs. (R., pp.4, 32-43.) In its post-hearing brief, the state ostensibly
would have clarified and polished its theories in light of the evidence, testimony, and arguments
presented during the suppression hearing. Because the state’s post-hearing response is not
contained in the record, the extent to which the state raised a particular argument and/or clarified
its previously raised arguments and/or abandoned an argument following the suppression hearing
is necessarily unknowable on this record.
Because Gonzalez provided an incomplete record, her claim that the prosecutor
abandoned a particular argument in the trial court is unreviewable by this Court, and the district
court’s intermediate appellate opinion should be affirmed on that basis.
D.

Even If This Court Reviews The Merits Of Gonzalez’s Claim Of Error On The
Incomplete Record, The District Court Correctly Concluded That The Issue Was Properly
Preserved For Appeal
The district court, acting in its appellate capacity, correctly concluded that the issue of

whether Gonzalez’s traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of DUI was preserved. (R.,
p.101.) Although the magistrate court did not address whether Sergeant Hodges’s observation of
Gonzalez’s driving pattern amounted to reasonable suspicion of DUI, this did not preclude the
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district court’s intermediate appellate review of the issue because the constitutionality of a
seizure is a question of law that the appellate court freely reviews if the issue has been preserved.
State v. Islas, 165 Idaho 260, 269, 443 P.3d 274, 283 (Ct. App. 2019) (noting the “de novo
standard of review is a free review of legal arguments preserved for appeal”).
To properly preserve an issue for appeal, “both the issue and the party’s position on the
issue must be raised before the trial court.” State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267,
1271 (2019); compare Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 395 P.3d
357 (2017) (holding that a party did not change its legal position toward a distinct legal issue on
appeal) with State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (holding
that the state presented a wholly new argument on appeal). “[S]ubstantive issues may not be
raised for the first time on appeal because allowing new issues on appeal would change the
function of the appellate courts.” Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at 98, 439 P.3d at 1270.
It is for the protection of inferior courts. It is manifestly unfair for a party to go
into court and slumber, as it were, on his defense, take no exception to the ruling,
present no point for the attention of the court, and seek to present his defense, that
was never mooted before, to the judgment of the appellate court. Such a practice
would destroy the purpose of an appeal and make the supreme court one for
deciding questions of law in the first instance.
Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 276, 396 P.3d at 705 (quoting Smith v. Sterling, 1 Idaho 128,
131 (1867)). In other words, appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories, and
arguments that were presented below. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 275, 396 P.3d at 704.
Even though the record is incomplete, it shows that the issue of whether Gonzalez’s
traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of DUI and the state’s position on that issue
were raised during the trial court proceedings. Gonzalez raised the issue of whether Sergeant
Hodges had reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify her traffic stop when she filed the motion
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to suppress. (R., pp.18-24.) In the motion, she relied primarily on the Idaho Supreme Court’s
decision in Fuller. (Id.) The Fuller Court explained, “[T]wo possible justifications for a traffic
stop exist: (1) the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver has committed an
offense, such as a traffic offense, or (2) the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
driver is engaged in other criminal activity, such as driving under the influence.” Fuller, 163
Idaho at 588, 416 P.3d at 960 (citing State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 442, 362 P.3d 514, 517
(2015)). Yet, Gonzalez only argued that Sergeant Hodges lacked reasonable suspicion that she
had committed a traffic offense under I.C. § 49-637, which requires drivers to maintain a single
lane of travel. (R., pp.18-21.)
By contrast, the record shows that the state raised both theories of reasonable suspicion in
response to Gonzalez’s motion to suppress. The state took the position that the traffic stop was
justified by a reasonable suspicion of DUI (“DUI theory”) and by a reasonable suspicion that
Gonzalez violated I.C. § 49-637(1) (“traffic offense theory”).

As to the DUI theory, the

prosecutor specifically elicited testimony from Sergeant Hodges regarding his reasons for
stopping Gonzalez. (10/2/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.18-25.) The officer testified that he stopped Gonzalez
after witnessing her driving pattern because it “led [him] to believe the driver might be impaired
or under the influence.” (Id. (emphasis added).) With respect to the traffic offense theory, the
prosecutor argued that Gonzalez’s driving pattern was distinguishable from the driving pattern at
issue in Fuller and that it amounted to reasonable suspicion that Gonzalez violated I.C. § 49637(1). (10/2/19 Tr., p.36, L.2 – p.41, L.7.) Because the issue and the state’s position on the
issue were raised during the trial court proceedings, the magistrate court certainly had “the
opportunity to address” whether the traffic stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of DUI.
Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at 98, 439 P.3d at 1270. Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded
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that the issue of whether the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of DUI was properly
preserved for intermediate appellate review.
Gonzalez contends the district court erroneously considered the state’s argument that the
stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of DUI because the state disavowed any such
argument during the suppression hearing.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-9.)

In support of her

argument, Gonzalez relies on a single statement made by the prosecutor during the suppression
hearing: “We’re not talking about reasonable suspicion for the DUI.” (Id. (citing 10/2/19 Tr.,
p.40, Ls.1-5).)

Gonzalez’s argument takes the prosecutor’s statement out of context and

otherwise lacks merit.
The transcript of the suppression hearing shows that the state did not disavow or abandon
the DUI theory during the suppression hearing. During cross-examination, Gonzalez’s trial
counsel asked Sergeant Hodges a series of questions related to a second officer, Officer Hurst,
who specializes in DUI investigations and arrived on scene at some point during the traffic stop
to conduct a DUI investigation. (10/2/19 Tr., p.20, L.23 – p.21, L.5; p.23, L.16 – p.27, L.11.)
During the prosecutor’s closing argument, he focused mainly on rebutting Gonzalez’s claim that
her driving pattern did not give rise to reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. (10/2/19 Tr.,
p.36, L.12 – p.40, L.9.) He articulated the traffic offense theory and then concluded by stating:
That driving pattern was crossing the fog line multiple times for a prolonged
amount of time, and that is reasonable suspicion for an infraction. We’re not
talking about reasonable suspicion for the DUI. Anything about Officer Hurst and
what was told to him is not really at issue, it’s just about that initial stop and that
multiple crossing of the line is reasonable suspicion.
(10/2/19 Tr., p.40, Ls.2-9.) Gonzalez’s argument that the prosecutor abandoned the DUI theory
ignores the prosecutor’s last statement, which provides important context for the preceding
sentence. Viewed in its proper context, the prosecutor was not affirmatively disavowing the DUI
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theory when he said, “We’re not talking about reasonable suspicion for the DUI.” (10/2/19 Tr.,
p.40, L.5.) Rather, in light of the questions posed to Sergeant Hodges on cross-examination
relating to Officer Hurst’s DUI investigation, the prosecutor was simply emphasizing that
Gonzalez had only challenged the legality of the traffic stop based on Sergeant Hodges’s
observation of her driving pattern, not the legality of the subsequent DUI investigation conducted
by Officer Hurst.
Beyond that, to interpret the prosecutor’s statement as disavowing the DUI theory would
ignore the fact that the prosecutor elicited specific testimony from Sergeant Hodges that he
stopped Gonzalez after observing her driving pattern because it led him to believe that she was
impaired or driving under the influence. (10/2/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.23-25.) It would also ignore
Sergeant Hodges’s testimony that he requested Officer Hurst’s assistance because he specializes
in DUI investigations and that Sergeant Hodges discussed Gonzalez’s driving pattern with
Officer Hurst in order to help him with the DUI investigation. (10/2/19 Tr., p.23, L.16 – p.24,
L.17.)
It is also worth noting that Gonzalez does not appear to challenge the district court’s
ultimate legal conclusion that her driving pattern gave rise to reasonable suspicion of DUI.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.5-10.) Nor could she do so successfully. Sergeant Hodges’s observations
of Gonzalez’s driving pattern undoubtedly gave rise to reasonable suspicion of DUI because it
fell outside “the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior.” State v.
Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664, 809 P.2d 522, 525 (Ct. App. 1991); see State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho
559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the officer possessed facts giving
rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle’s driver was intoxicated based
solely on the observation that the car was weaving within its lane around midnight and touched
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the lines on the edges of the lane three times despite never entirely leaving the lane of travel);
State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 209, 953 P.2d 645, 649 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the traffic
stop was justified by reasonable suspicion of DUI where the officer observed the suspect driving
at slow speed, hugging of the fog line, weaving in his lane of travel, crossing the fog line to the
width of a tire, and then moving left to touch the center line one or two times, all within a mile.)
In sum, the state did not disavow the argument that the stop was justified by reasonable
suspicion of DUI during the suppression hearing. Accordingly, the district court did not err when
it freely reviewed the issue. Likewise, the district court did not err in concluding that Gonzalez’s
driving pattern gave rise to reasonable suspicion of DUI. Gonzalez has failed to show otherwise.
E.

Even If The District Court Erroneously Reversed The Magistrate Court’s Order Based On
An Unpreserved Issue, This Court May Still Affirm The District Court’s Decision
“[W]here an order of the district court is correct but based upon an erroneous theory, this

Court will affirm upon the correct theory. This doctrine is sometimes called the ‘right resultwrong theory’ rule.” Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 275, 396 P.3d at 704 (quotation omitted).
The “right result-wrong theory” doctrine applies when “the lower court finds one theory to be
dispositive and decides the case only on that theory—to the exclusion of other theories that were
raised.” State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 222, 443 P.3d 231, 236 (2019). “The purpose of the
rule is twofold. It promotes finality by upholding a decision on alternate bases that were
adequately supported by the record even if incorrectly decided.

It also promotes judicial

economy by reducing both time and costs for the parties and the court system.” Id. “By
upholding the result on an alternate theory which would have been dispositive upon remand, the
rule eliminates a duplicative proceeding.” Id.
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In this case, the state presented both the DUI theory and the traffic offense theory to the
magistrate court and to the district court. (10/2/19 Tr., p.9, Ls.18-25; p.36, L.2 – p.41, L.7; R.,
pp.65-69.)

The magistrate court did not reach the issue of whether Sergeant Hodges’s

observation of Gonzalez’s driving pattern amounted to reasonable suspicion of DUI, despite
having the opportunity to do so. (R., pp.44-49.) Instead, the trial court granted the motion to
suppress because it concluded that the traffic stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion that
Gonzalez’s conduct rose to the level of violating I.C. § 49-637.

(Id.)

Conversely, on

intermediate appeal the district court did not rule on the traffic offense theory. (R., pp.97-102.)
With respect to the traffic offense theory, the court simply stated, “Whether the officer’s
observation of the Respondent’s driving was sufficient to establish a violation of I.C. § 49-637(1)
is not determinative.”

(R., p.101.)

Instead, the district court held that “[t]he officer had

reasonable suspicion to stop” Gonzalez based on his reasonable concern that she was impaired.
(R., pp.101-02.) Thus, even if the state’s DUI theory was unpreserved for intermediate appellate
review, this Court may still affirm the district court’s decision under the “right result-wrong
theory rule” because Sergeant Hodges’s observation of Gonzalez’s driving pattern amounted to
reasonable suspicion that she violated I.C. § 49-637(1).
A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and implicates
the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Under the
Fourth Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if
there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic
laws. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); Flowers, 131 Idaho at 208, 953 P.2d at
648.

The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the
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circumstances at the time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709
(Ct. App. 1999). The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more
than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. An officer may draw reasonable
inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the
officer’s experience and law enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319, 321, 756
P.2d 1083, 1085 (Ct. App. 1988).
In Neal, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether driving onto, but not over, a fog
line was sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion of a violation of I.C. § 49-637(1). Neal,
159 Idaho at 442, 362 P.3d at 517. The Court held “that driving onto but not across the line
marking the right edge of the road does not violate [I.C. §] 49-637 and therefore the officer’s stop
… was not justified.” Neal, 159 Idaho at 447, 362 P.3d at 522.
In Fuller, the Idaho Supreme Court expanded its holding in Neal. The question presented
in Fuller was whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop for violating
I.C. § 49-637(1) based on the stipulated fact that “the front passenger-side tire of Fuller’s vehicle
crossed the fog line once and that she did not have her turn signal on at the time.” Fuller, 163
Idaho at 587, 416 P.3d at 959. The Court concluded that “an isolated incident of temporarily
crossing the fog line … does not violate section 49-637(1).” Fuller, 163 Idaho at 590, 416 P.3d
at 962.
“Importantly, however, the Court’s opinions in Neal and Fuller did not strip the fog line
(or other lane markings) of all meaning for purposes of conducting a traffic stop pursuant to I.C.
§ 49-637(1).” State v. Devan, 168 Idaho 242, ___, 482 P.3d 577, 581 (Ct. App. 2020), review
denied (Mar. 24, 2021). The Fuller Court explained:
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Merely that a tire temporarily touches or crosses the fog line will not by itself give
rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that section 49-637(1) has been violated.
To be sure, driving onto or across the fog line may be considered when evaluating
whether an overall pattern of erratic or unsafe driving gives rise to a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that section 49-637(1) has been violated under the totality of
the circumstances. But that suspicion must be based on more than one tire
temporarily touching or briefly crossing the fog line.
Fuller, 163 Idaho at 590, 416 P.3d at 962 (citing United States v. Alvarado, 430 F.3d 1305, 1309
(10th Cir. 2005) (holding that an officer had a reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle for a traffic
offense after observing the vehicle crossing one foot over the fog line); United States v.
Williams, 945 F.Supp.2d 665, 672 (E.D. Va. 2013) (“[T]he officer witnessed Defendant’s
vehicle repeatedly weaving and driving on one of the fog lines on at least five occasions. The
initial touching lasted for approximately five feet—far from a quick, isolated touching.”); People
v. Geier, 407 Ill.App.3d 553, 348 Ill.Dec. 552, 944 N.E.2d 793 (2011) (concluding the traffic
stop was based on reasonable suspicion where the officer observed all four of the defendant’s
tires cross the fog line); State v. McBroom, 179 Or.App. 120, 39 P.3d 226 (2002) (holding that
an officer had probable cause to conduct a traffic stop after the defendant drove for more than
three hundred feet on the centerline for no apparent reason).

“Thus, Fuller left open the

possibility that law enforcement, and reviewing courts, could appropriately find that reasonable
suspicion of a violation of I.C. § 49-637(1) may be based upon driving behavior relative to the
fog line.” Devan, 168 Idaho at ___, 482 P.3d at 581.
Devan was such a case. In that case, the Court of Appeals held that a vehicle inexplicably
straddling the fog line for approximately one hundred yards and encroaching on the shoulder of a
roadway used by pedestrians and cyclists gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver
violated I.C. § 49-637(1). Devan, 168 Idaho at ___ - ___, 482 P.3d at 581-82.
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Like Devan, Gonzalez’s driving pattern is sufficiently distinguishable from the isolated
and temporary incidences of touching or crossing the fog line at issue in Neal and Fuller to give
rise to reasonable suspicion that Gonzalez violated I.C. §49-637(1). Gonzalez was driving alone
on a straight, flat, dry road. (R., p.46; 10/2/19 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-9; p.32, Ls.1-2; see State’s Exs.13.) Notwithstanding the favorable driving conditions, she inexplicably drove across the fog line
and into a bike line several times. (R., p.45; 10/2/19 Tr., p.8, L.20 – p.9, L.17.) On the last
occasion, she crossed the fog line by about one foot and travelled down the roadway while
straddling the fog line for approximately two hundred yards – twice the distance travelled by the
driver in Devan. (Id.) The trial court’s unchallenged factual findings support the conclusion that
Sergeant Hodges’s observation of Gonzalez’s driving pattern amounted to a reasonable suspicion
that she violated I.C. § 49-637(1). The magistrate court erroneously held otherwise. (R., pp.4449.) Therefore, this Court can and should affirm the district court’s intermediate appellate
opinion reversing the order of the trial court granting Gonzalez’s motion to suppress even if the
Court determines that the district court did so on an unpreserved theory.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s intermediate appellate
opinion.
DATED this 29th day of June, 2021.

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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